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THROTTLING MIRANDA
Author: Donald E. Wilkes, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of
Law
Published in Flagpole Magazine (July 21, 2010) (online edition)

Originally, the term “thug” . . . was Hindi for “swindler.” Beginning
in the thirteenth century, the Thugs traveled around India in bands,
preying on travelers. With great cunning they would ambush their mark or
lure him to an isolated spot, then throttle him.–Irving Wallace, David
Wallechinsky, and Amy Wallace, SIGNIFICA, pp. 119-20 (1983)
If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of
a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that
system.–Arthur J. Goldberg (Associate Justice, U. S. Supreme Court,
1962-65)

The 1966 Miranda v. Arizona decision is arguably the most
important and undeniably the most famous of all U.S. Supreme
Court criminal procedure decisions. The noble purpose of this legal
landmark is to prevent Americans taken into custody by police on
criminal charges from being subjected to improper interrogation
practices calculated to compel citizens to incriminate themselves.
Few people realize that since the early 1970s the Supreme Court has
been stealthily choking the life out of Miranda. The latest example
of this process of slow strangulation occurred a few weeks ago, on
June 1, when the Court in Berghuis v. Thompkins reversed a lower
court and held that a man convicted of murder in a Michigan state
court was not entitled to a new trial. This 5-4 decision, with Justice
Kennedy writing the majority opinion for the Court and Justice
Sotomayer authoring the opinion for the four dissenters, will be
comprehensively examined later in this article.

Miranda resulted from the Supreme Court’s enlightened
determination, based on decades of reviewing cases where a
criminal suspect had confessed, to curtail illegitimate yet
widespread interrogation practices of American police, who take
prisoners to back rooms of police stations, hold them there
incommunicado, and interrogate them in secrecy and without
recording what happens in the interrogation room. Until fairly
recently, standard police interrogation procedures involved use of
the third degree–the infliction of mental or physical pain. Although
third degree practices still occur, most current police interrogation
methods emphasize psychological ploys and pressures as the
preferred way of softening up the interrogatee. Experienced
professional interrogators barrage the isolated prisoner with a
variety of mind-numbing strategems–trickery, deceit, deception,
subterfuge, chicanery, and other artifices–designed to induce him to
make incriminating admissions. These police practices mean that
custodial interrogation is police-dominated and inherently coercive.
These practices disrespect due process and the self-incrimination
privilege, to put it mildly. They also are apt to induce innocent
persons to make false confessions. Approximately 15% of this
nation’s DNA exonerees made false confessions during police
interrogation. In short, in the words of the Miranda decision,
custodial interrogation as practiced by this country’s police forces
“exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weaknesses
of individuals.”
To protect Americans from illegitimate police interrogation
practices, Miranda guarantees them the right to remain silent when
interrogated and the right to have a lawyer present before and
during the interrogation. These fundamental rights may be waived,
but only voluntarily and only if the prisoner has, prior to
interrogation, been fully advised of his Miranda rights by police.
This is why, before questioning arrested suspects, police must advise
them that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they
say may be used against them, that they have the right to an

attorney’s presence before and during questioning, and that if they
can’t afford an attorney one will be provided free.
The Supreme Court’s campaign to suffocate Miranda is due to
appointment of right-wing justices to the Supreme Court by four
right-wing Republican presidents–Nixon, Reagan, and the two
Bushes. These justices are leading this nation through what
scholars call the Supreme Court’s “Criminal Procedure
Counterrevolution.” These justices tend to favor government over
the citizen and to subordinate the rights of individuals to the power
of the state; they have broadened the powers of police and
prosecutors and narrowed the rights of citizens. These justices
usually take the side of government in criminal procedure cases by
ruling for prosecutors against defendants, for police against
suspects, and for wardens against inmates. Miranda, an antigovernment, pro-individual rights decision, is anathema to them. In
consequence these justices have over the years repeatedly wounded
and weakened Miranda by applying it woodenly, hypertechnically,
or unrealistically, and by carving out exceptions to the decision. A
detailed analysis of these decisions–and there are over thirty of
them–is impractical here. The worst of them was a 1986 decision in
which the Court held there was no Miranda violation where police
deceived the incommunicado interrogatee by not telling him that his
lawyer had called the police station in his behalf and was trying to
reach him, and where in addition police deceived the lawyer by
falsely telling her that her client would not be interrogated. In a
pitiful effort to defend a holding manifesting both creepy empathy
for police overreaching and alarming callousness toward the rights
of Americans, the Court’s opinion preposterously pontificated: “We
have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a
suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate self interest
in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights . . . . (!)”
Against this background let us now turn to the June 1 Berghuis
decision. Ohio police arrested the suspect, Chester Thompkins, on a

Michigan murder charge. Two Michigan police officers then
traveled to the Ohio police station where Thompkins was jailed.
The two policemen took him to an 8 by 10 feet interrogation room
and placed him in a straight-backed wooden chair. The
interrogation session lasted three hours. Since police deliberately
failed to record the session, there is some dispute about what
happened. The following, however, appears to be a fairly accurate
account of what transpired during this secret inquisition.
First, police properly advised Thompkins of his Miranda rights,
whereupon Thompkins refused to sign a document acknowledging
that he understood his rights, and remained silent. Police then
began interrogating Thompkins, who for the next two hours and
forty-five minutes remained largely silent except for complaining
about his uncomfortable chair and declining an offer of a
peppermint. Occasionally he nodded his head or gave a one-word
or other brief response to a question, but on the whole the
interrogation was, in the words of the interrogators, “very, very
one-sided” and “nearly a monologue” during which Thompkins was
“sullen” and “peculiar.” After nearly three hours of this, the
interrogators (using the old ploy of appealing to the interrogatee’s
religious beliefs) extracted a one-word incriminating remark from
Thompkins. Thompkins was asked, “Do you believe in God?” and
replied, in tears, “Yes.” Then he was asked, “Do you pray to God?”
to which he again replied, “Yes.” In response to the question “Do
you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?”
Thompkins replied, “Yes.” Fifteen minutes later the interrogation
ended.
The first basic issue decided by the Supreme Court was whether
Thompkins had invoked his right to silence before making the
incriminating statement. (Under Miranda, police must terminate an
interrogation as soon as the suspect invokes his right to silence or
requests a lawyer. Therefore, if Thompkins had invoked his right to
silence before the point in the interrogation when he made the

incriminating remark, the remark would have been obtained in
violation of Miranda and hence inadmissible.) This issue was pretty
much a no-brainer, for in Miranda itself the Court had said that
interrogation must cease if the suspect “indicates in any manner, at
any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent
. . . .” Here Thompkins had remained uncooperative, almost
entirely unresponsive, and nearly silent for nearly three hours; he
had hardly spoken at all throughout a prolonged interrogation
session. The current Court, however, held that Thompkins had not
invoked his right to silence by his near-silence and uncooperative
behavior. The only way the right to silence can be invoked, the
Court startlingly decreed, is by the suspect unambiguously and
unequivocally stating his wish to remain silent. Since Thompkins
did not say the words “I want to remain silent,” or “I do not want to
talk to you,” he had not invoked his right to silence. The Court did
not, however, require police to tell the suspect that specific words
are required to invoke the right or that anything less than the magic
words is insufficient to assert the right. Furthermore, the Court
held, it was of no consequence that in the face of Thompkins’
uncooperativeness police failed prior to interrogating him to ask
him any questions to clarify whether he was claiming his right to
silence.
The Court therefore rejected Thompkins’ claim that in violation of
Miranda he had been interrogated after asserting his right to remain
silent.
The Court was thus counterintuitively holding that remaining silent
in the face of police questioning does not, by itself, invoke the right
to silence, and that in order to invoke this right the suspect is
compelled to speak. The Court was demanding that assertions of
rights made by a secluded captive inside an interrogation room be
expressed specifically and clearly. The Court was deeming it as too
much of a burden on police to require them, when an interrogatee’s
response to the advice of rights is ambiguous or equivocal, to simply

ask for clarification. The Court was also undermining the
effectiveness of the Miranda warnings themselves, which do not tell
the suspect what is required for him to assert his right to silence.
What is the point of advising a suspect of his right to silence if he is
not told the specifics of how to assert that right? Unless they are to
be reduced to a mockery, the warnings will now have to be revised
to tell the suspect exactly what he must do to exercise his right to
silence. (Furthermore, since the Court in Berghuis gratuitously
further held that the suspect must invoke his right to counsel
unambiguously and unequivocally, the warnings with regard to
counsel will also need revision if they are to remain meaningful.)
Under Miranda, a confession is inadmissible, even where the suspect
has not invoked his right to silence or right to counsel, unless the
prosecution establishes that, after the Miranda warnings have been
given, the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda
rights before confessing. Thus, even accepting that Thompkins’
failure to assert his right to silence with the specificity required by
the Court meant that he had not invoked that right, the question
remained whether there had been a waiver of Miranda rights. The
second basic issue before the Court in Berghuis, therefore, was
whether Thompkins had waived his rights before making his oneword inculpatory statement.
Under the original Miranda holding, this issue was another apparent
no-brainer. Miranda states that proving waiver is a “heavy burden;”
that “[w]hatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights
by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado
incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the
accused did not validly waive his rights;” and that “waiver will not be
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are
given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually
obtained.”
The Berghuis Court, however, thought Thompkins had waived his

Miranda rights when he confessed, although the Court avoided
stating exactly when this waiver occurred. The Court did
acknowledge that “[s]ome language in Miranda could read to
indicate that waivers are difficult to establish absent an explicit
written waiver or a formal, express oral statement.” However, the
Court said, subsequent decisions–by which it meant decisions
eroding Miranda–demonstrate that “waivers can be established even
absent formal or express statements of waiver . . . . The prosecution
therefore does not need to show that a waiver of Miranda rights was
express. An ‘implicit waiver’ of the right to remain silent is
sufficient . . . .” Under these post-Miranda holdings, therefore, the
Court said, Miranda “does not impose a formalistic waiver
procedure that a suspect must follow to relinquish those rights.”
Therefore, a defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of
his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may support a
conclusion that he has impliedly waived his rights. And here, the
Court thought, where Thompkins had been fully advised of his
rights and understood those rights, he had thereafter “engaged in a
course of conduct indicating waiver . . . .”
Both of the basic issues in the case were therefore resolved in favor
of the state and against a criminal defendant’s claim of violation of
rights.
The Court’s holding that Thompkins’ conduct amounted to an
implicit waiver of his rights flies in the face of both the letter and
spirit of Miranda. As Justice Sotomayer said in her dissent, it is
surely “unreasonable” here to conclude that “the prosecution met
its ‘heavy burden’ of proof on a record consisting of three one-word
answers, following 2 hours and 45 minutes of silence punctuated by
a few largely nonverbal responses to unidentified questions. . . .
That Thompkins did not make the inculpatory statements at issue
until after approximately 2 hours and 45 minutes of interrogation
serves as strong evidence against waiver.” (The dissent also had the
better of the argument on the question of whether Thompkins had

invoked his right to silence. “Advising a suspect that he has a ‘right
to remain silent’ is unlikely to convey that he must speak (and must
do so in some particular fashion) to ensure the right will be
protected. . . . [W]hen a suspect sits silent throughout prolonged
interrogation, long past the point when he could be deciding
whether to respond–[his behavior] cannot reasonably be understood
other than as an invocation of the right to remain silent.”)
The actual decision of the five-justice majority in Berghuis is
disturbing, but even more disturbing is the pro-state, anti-individual
rights mentality underlying the decision. What a bunch of
cheerleaders for police the five-justice majority in Berghuis is!
What apologists for the crime control establishment! We now have
a Supreme Court which in criminal procedure cases strains and
grunts in order to side with the powerful law enforcement
establishment over the citizen, in complete lack of sympathy for
prisoners caught up in the toils of America’s custodial interrogation
system. It insists on nice technicalities when it comes to assertions
of rights by a solitary prisoner detained inside an interrogation
room. If a suspect wishes to remain silent or to have an attorney he
must comply with formalistic requirements. He must invoke his
rights unambiguously and unequivocally, and if (in the memorable
words of Justice Souter) he fails to “speak with the discrimination of
an Oxford don” the police my proceed as if no rights have been
invoked. Moreover, if the suspect’s response to the Miranda advice
of rights is equivocal, so that a reasonable issue exists as to whether
the suspect has asserted his rights, the police need not seek
clarification and may proceed the same way they would proceed if
the suspect had expressly and formally announced that he was
foregoing his rights.
The Court’s love affair with formalism and explicitness vanishes
when it comes to waivers of rights. This Court, in its own words,
“does not impose a formalistic waiver requirement that a suspect
must follow to relinquish [his] rights” and believes that “waivers

can be established even absent formal or express statements of
waiver . . . .” We have a Court crazily insisting that invocations of
rights be express and explicit while simultaneously permitting
implied and implicit waivers of rights.
What can be done about this ridiculous situation in which the fate of
liberty in the nation’s highest court is in the hands of right-wing
ideologues? Only future judicial appointments can produce a Court
more sensitive to individual rights and less slanted in favor of
government. A Court less likely inclined in criminal procedure
cases to favor the state over the individual. A Court which expands
Miranda protections–by requiring, for example, that after giving the
Miranda warnings police expressly ask the suspect in yes or no
terms whether he wants a lawyer or (if he doesn’t) whether he
wishes to exercise his right to silence. A Court, in short, which
breathes new life into Miranda, instead of asphyxiating it with
chokeholds.

